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Predictions made by imprecise-probability models are often indeterminate (that is, set-
valued). Measuring the quality of an indeterminate prediction by a single number is im-
portant to fairly compare different models, but a principled approach to this problem is
currently missing. In this paper we derive, from a set of assumptions, a metric to evaluate
the predictions of credal classifiers. These are supervised learning models that issue set-
valued predictions. Themetric turns out to bemade of an objective component, and another
that is related to the decision-maker’s degree of risk aversion to the variability of predictions.
We discuss when the measure can be rendered independent of such a degree, and provide
insights as to how the comparison of classifiers based on the newmeasure changes with the
number of predictions to be made. Finally, we make extensive empirical tests of credal, as
well as precise, classifiers by using the new metric. This shows the practical usefulness of
the metric, while yielding a first insightful and extensive comparison of credal classifiers.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Whenweuse an imprecise-probabilitymodel tomake predictions,wemeet one of themost striking differences of impre-
cise probability in comparison to precise probability: the imprecise-probability model can issue indeterminate predictions.
That is, among the set of possible options, the model may drop some of them as sub-optimal, while keeping the entire
remaining set as its prediction. The prediction is generally indeterminate as such a set is not necessarily a singleton. Inde-
terminate predictions are a crucially important feature of imprecise-probability models: they allow credible, and reliable,
predictions to be obtained no matter how scarce is the information available to build a model.
Yet, we should have away tomeasure howgood is an indeterminate prediction. Amajor reason is thatwe need to compare
imprecise- with precise-probability models: we should have a simple and possibly shared way to say which one is better in
a given application. The same consideration applies whenwe compare two imprecise-probability models. Ideally, wewould
like to be able to reward each prediction by a single number, be it determinate or indeterminate. Most probably this would
speed up progress in the field, as it would enable comparisons to be automatized over a large number of test applications.
In the case of precise-probability models, there are well-consolidated measures to do this. Let us consider the field of
pattern classification [11], which is the focus of this paper (Section 2 gives a brief introduction to classification problems).
In this case, the predictive models are called (precise) classifiers. A classifier predicts one out of a finite set C of so-called
classes. In this case, correct predictions may be rewarded with 1 and incorrect ones with 0, thus giving rise to the measure
of performance called the predictive accuracy of a classifier: i.e., the proportion of correct predictions it makes.
The situation is very different with credal classifiers, that is, classifiers that issue set-valued predictions. One of the few
proposals to evaluate an indeterminate prediction by a single number can be found in [7]: a prediction made of a set
K of k classes is rewarded with 1/k if it contains the actual class, and with 0 otherwise. This gives rise to the measure
called discounted accuracy, which was borrowed from the field of multi-label classification [22]. The problem here is that no
justification is given for discounted accuracy, as the work in [7] points out. In [17], classifiers which return indeterminate
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classifications are evaluated through the F-metric, originally designed for information retrieval problems; but also in this
case, there is no actual justification for the choice of this measure. Other than these, the past proposals are either explicitly
non-numerical, as the rank test in [7], or require a vector of parameters to evaluate the performance, as in [6]. The latter
approach is meaningful, but was conceived to compare credal with precise classifiers, and cannot be easily extended to the
more general case;moreover, it is amethod that needs supervision so that it does not easily lend itself to be run automatically
on many test cases.
In our view, the scarcity of principled numerical evaluation methods for credal classifiers is not accidental: in fact, it is
not easy to assign a single number to an indeterminate prediction. Consider the following case: there is a vacuous classifier,
which every time predicts the set of all classes C, and a random one, which picks up a class from C through the uniform
distribution. IfC is made of two classes (we say that the classification problem is binary), andwe use the predictive accuracy,
the random classifier has an expected reward equal to 1/2. What should be the expected reward of the vacuous classifier?
Both classifiers do not know how to predict the class, but only the vacuous classifier declares it. From this, one might argue
that the latter should be rewarded with more than 1/2. On the other hand, it is clear also that the vacuous classifier cannot
predict the class better than the random one, so that one might argue that it should be rewarded with 1/2 too.
In the attempt to address these kinds of problems in the most objective way, we found it useful to regard classifiers as
bettors. In the betting framework introduced in Section 3, we assume we only know how to value determinate predictions,
in particular by 0-1 rewards. In Section 4, we extend the framework, in a kind of least-committal way, to credal classifiers:
we show that, under reasonable assumptions, indeterminate predictions should be valued according to discounted accuracy.
Note, however, that discounted accuracy values the vacuous and the random classifiers the same. This kind of (question-
able) effect can be traced back to having deliberately avoided introducing subjective considerations in the evaluation. Still,
subjective preferences should be accounted for: we introduce in Section 5 a decision maker in charge of selecting the ‘best’
classifier in the next bet, and show that preferences can enter the picture through his utility, as a function of discounted
accuracy. This defines the measure we propose to evaluate credal classifiers: utility-discounted predictive accuracy. More
generally speaking, this shows in a very definite sense how the reliability of a classifier is tightly related to the variability of
its predictions, and that the aversion to this variability is what makes some people prefer credal classifier to precise ones.
In Section 6 we briefly discuss how utility-discounted accuracy can equivalently, and quite naturally, be derived also in a
framework based on money bets. This illustrates the tight relationship of our approach with finance.
In Section 7 we discuss an important case where the evaluation can still be made in quite an objective way despite the
decision-maker’s subjective preferences, and we relate this to the amount of indeterminacy produced by a credal classifier.
In Section 8 we analyze how the picture changes if we focus on evaluating classifiers in the next m ≥ 1 bets. We show
that the difference between precise and credal classifiers decreases with growing m, so that the relative benefits of credal
classification are less pronounced for largem.
Section 9 is entirely devoted to the empirical evaluation of credal classifiers based on utility-discounted accuracy. We
start by discussing the choice of sensible utility functions for our aim, that is, the fair comparison of credal classifiers. In
Section 9.1, we focus the comparison on two classifiers representative of the precise and the credal categories: naive Bayes
classifier (NBC [9]) and naive credal classifier (NCC [25,26,6]). We infer and test them both on artificial data and on 55 real
data sets from the well-known UCI repository. This shows, as expected, that NCC yields particular advantages over NBC on
small learning sets. In more general conditions the situation is somewhat more balanced, although it tends to be in favor of
NCC when the decision maker has strong preferences towards reliability of classification. It is also shown clearly that when
the NCC is indeterminate, the NBC issues fragile predictions; this confirms past results in the literature.
The comparison is extended in Section 9.2 to other credal classifiers (again on the UCI data sets): a local (that is, lazy)
version of NCC [7]; a classifier obtained through imprecise-probabilistic model averaging of NBCs [5]; and a classification
tree extended to imprecise probability [1,2]. A thorough analysis highlights different characteristics of the involved credal
classifiers, and, at the same time, a substantial balance in their predictive performances (in particular when they are used
jointlywith feature selection to reduceoverfitting). It isworth remarking that this kindof extensiveand insightful comparison
is made here for the first time, thanks to the availability of utility-discounted accuracy.
Section 9.3 is devoted to a detailed comparison of NCC with a set-valued classifier developed within precise probability:
the non-deterministic classifier (NDC) of Coz et al. [17]. This comparison is interesting because thementioned classifierswork
according to very different principles, even though both yield set-valued classifications.Moreover, the discussion shows how
the F-metric used in [17] for comparing classifiers, can bemeaningfully re-interpreted as a utility function in our framework.
This provided a justification for such a metric that was not available before. The comparison of NCC with NDC gives us the
opportunity to consider a related question in Section 9.4: the extent to which a fair comparison of classifiers is possible
to do when some of them implement the so-called rejection option: this is a precise-probability tool to issue set-valued
classifications that relies on the inspection of the posterior probabilities assigned to the classes.
Our concluding remarks are in Section 10.
2. Classification problems
A classification problem is made of objects described by attribute (or feature) variables, which we group into the sin-
gle variable A, and a class variable C. The class variable represents the object’s category. There are finitely many possible
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categories, which we identify with their indexes to simplify notation: {1, . . . , n} =: C. We denote by c the generic element
of C. The attribute variable represents some characteristics of the object that are related to the class. Variable A takes values
in the set A; we denote by a its generic element. As an example, objects might be patients. A would represent a patient’s
profile: that is, personal information as well as the outcomes of medical tests. Cwould index the patient’s possible diseases.
Usually, some values of (A, C) are sampled in an independent and identically distributed way according to a law that is
not known a priori. The so-called learning set L records those values, which are also called instances of (A, C). The goal of
classification is to learn from the learning set a function that maps attributes into classes; we call this function a (precise)
classifier. With reference to the above medical example, the goal would be to understand from data how a patient’s profile
is related to disease: a classifier in this case would be a function that takes in input a profile and outputs a prediction about
the patient’s disease.
A classifier’s predictions are rewarded through a reward matrix R. This is an n × n matrix whose generic element rij is
a number representing the reward obtained by predicting class i when the actual class is j. Equivalently, we can regard the
reward matrix as a set of gambles (i.e., bounded random variables) Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, each one corresponding to a row of
R: gamble Ri represents the uncertain reward obtained by predicting class i and is defined by Ri(j) := rij , with j ∈ C. The
reward matrix is an input of the classification problem, in the sense that it is given.
In classification, at least with respect to the machine learning practice, rewards are usually measured in a linear utility
scale: although this point is often left implicit, we can deduce it from the observation that the performance of a classifier is
usually identified with its expected reward.
A very frequent practice consists also in using just a 0-1 valued reward matrix, which we denote by I (Table 1 shows
matrix I for the simplest case of a binary classification problem).
Table 1
0–1 Reward matrix for a binary classification problem.
Actual class
1 2
Predicted class
1 1 0
2 0 1
In this case, the gamble corresponding to the i-th row of thematrix coincides with the indicator function of set {i}, which
yields Ii(i) = 1, and Ii(j) = 0 for i = j. Accordingly, the performance of a classifier corresponds to the probability of
predicting the actual class. Such a probability is called the predictive accuracy (or simply the accuracy) of a classifier. The
term ‘accuracy’ is used also for the sample estimate of such a probability. In fact, a classification problem usually comeswith
a test set T. This set contains a number of sampled instances of (A, C) that are used to evaluate the classifier’s predictive
performance by measuring its accuracy on them.
The widespread use of predictive accuracy has probably been favored by its simple interpretation; a more substantial
reason could be that the predictive accuracy is particularly convenient to make extensive comparisons of classifiers over
many data sets, which is a key component of the machine learning practice. Accordingly, in this paper we focus on the 0-1
valued reward matrix I, and as a consequence on measures of accuracy that are not cost sensitive. This is not to say that
we support the abuse of 0-1 rewards to evaluate classifiers: we believe that a careful elicitation of rewards would arguably
lead in many cases to a reward matrix more general than I. There are indeed a number of measures alternative to predictive
accuracy proposed in the field of classification for the case where different types of error, such as false positives and false
negatives, should be given different rewards. This is the case, for instance, of so-called sensitivity and specificity measures
[11]. On the other hand, the case of 0-1 rewards makes the treatment easier and at the same time it is arguably one of the
most important cases to consider.
So far we have introduced the traditional view of classification, where the predictions issued by (precise) classifiers are
made of single classes. This viewhas been generalized through the introduction of credal classifiers [25,27]. A credal classifier
is also a function learned from set L, but it maps the attributes of an instance into a non-empty set K ⊆ C of k := |K|
classes in general. We call this a set-valued classification. We also say that the classification is determinate when k = 1,
and indeterminate otherwise. When a classification is fully indeterminate, that is, whenK= C, we call it vacuous. Similarly,
the vacuous classifier is the one that always issues vacuous predictions. To each credal classifier it is possible to associate a
determinate classifier that outputs predictions by choosing every time a class uniformly at random1 from the output setK
of the credal classifier. We call this theK-random classifier; when the related credal classifier is the vacuous one, we just call
it the random classifier.
Evaluating a credal classifier can be regarded as the problem of defining an ‘extended’ reward matrix, which associates a
reward gamble to each non-empty subset of classes. For instance, suppose that one believes that the vacuous and the random
classifiers should be evaluated equally in a binary classification problem characterized by matrix I. The corresponding
extended reward matrix is given in Table 2.
1 Throughout the paper we use the word ‘random’ to mean uniformly random.
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Table 2
An extended reward matrix for a binary classification problem featuring reward
matrix I. This specific extended reward matrix, which values the random and the
vacuous classifiers the same, originates the metric called discounted accuracy in
[7] (see also Section 4). Observe that in problemswithmore than two classes, there
will obviously be more rows to fill with the appropriate rewards gambles.
Actual class
1 2
Predicted class
1 1 0
2 0 1
{1, 2} 0.5 0.5
3. Introducing the betting framework
In order tomake the comparisonof credal classifiers as objective as possible,we introduce the idea of a betting framework.
We define the framework for a traditional problem of classification, where classifiers issue determinate predictions. In
Section 4 we will extend the framework to credal classification.
In the framework under consideration, we have two classifiers, which we would like to compare, that have already been
inferred from data (so that there is no further learning, only an evaluation stage). We build the framework in such a way
that the better the predictions a classifier issues the more it earns. In other words, the idea is that the best classifier should
improve its wealth more then the remaining classifier. Let us make the betting framework more precise by describing the
two types of actors that play a role there:
Bettors: each of the two classifier we aim at comparing is regarded as a bettor.
House: rewards are delivered to bettors by an artificial entity that we call House. House only accepts determinate bets.
Bets correspond to instances of theproblemof classification: a bet is set upby sampling an instance of theproblem. Classifiers
are required to bet by predicting the actual class of the instance, and are rewarded according to matrix I. The process is
repeated for ever, and the performance of classifiers is taken to be their predictive accuracy.
Bettors and House are characterized by clarifying their relationship with the rewards, that is, with the utility scale
involved. To start with, based on the discussion made in Section 2, we can readily state our first assumption concerning the
betting framework:
(A1) Utility of bettors is linear in the rewards.
This assumption simply states explicitly what is current practice in classification.
The second assumption concerns House. We want to model House as an agent whose only aim is to reward correct
predictions. In other words, House should not introduce any subjective bias in the process of rewarding bettors because of
a risk-averse or risk-seeking attitude; it should just be risk neutral:
(A2) Utility of House is linear in the rewards.
4. Betting with credal classifiers
Nowwewould like to extend the betting framework to credal classifiers. The crucial point here is that House only accepts
determinate bets,while a credal classifier outputs set-valued classifications in general. Therefore, if wewant to allow a credal
classifier to play, we should find a way to extend the reward matrix to set-valued classifications in a way that both House
and bettor find acceptable.
The first step in this direction is to recognize that any negotiation between the credal classifier and House can be made
only on the basis of determinate bets, which is the only language that House understands. In order to enable the credal
classifier to play as a determinate bettor, we state the following assumption:
(A3) The credal bettor accepts betting on any single class from its set-valued prediction, if forced to make a determinate
bet, and on no class outside that set.
Observe that we write ‘if forced to make a determinate bet’ here, as we are not assuming that a credal classifier would
otherwise be fine with always issuing a determinate bet. The interest in this assumption is rather in making sure that a
classifier that wants to play the present game agrees that the actual class should be sought for in the classes that make up
the set-valued prediction rather than outside that set. Assumption (A3) is typically satisfied when the classes in the output
set are incomparable (i.e., they cannot be ranked), and the other ones represent dominated options. This is the case when
credal classifiers are obtained using sets of probabilities and decision criteria like maximality or e-admissibility (see, e.g.,
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[23, Section 3.9]). We state the assumption explicitly in order to allow the framework to be used also by credal classifiers
created in a different way.
The next assumption formalizes the idea that the framework is run for ever:
(A4) Every possible bet is repeated infinitely many times in the betting framework by sampling the problem instances.
This assumption, together with the former one, allows us to consider the behavior of the credal classifier in the limit of
infinitely many bets: in particular, if we denote by K a specific set-valued prediction made by the credal classifier, we
can consider the limiting frequency by which the credal classifier selects each of the k classes in K. We summarize these
frequencies σi, i ∈ K, by a probability mass function σ := (σi)i∈K . We call σ a randomized strategy; it represents the
determinate betting behavior of the credal classifier in the limit.
At this point House realizes that in principle the credal classifier has the freedom to implement any randomized betting
strategy: this means that the credal classifier can actually force House to undergo any expected loss that can follow from
the choice of the strategy.
Let us call a predictionK ‘successful’ if the actual class belongs toK. We restrict the attention to successful predictions
as they determine House’s expected loss: in fact, an unsuccessful prediction always yields a zero loss, by definition of I,
irrespectiveof the randomized strategy adopted. Let θ := (θj)j∈C be thevector of chances, that is, thepopulationproportions,
for the classes conditional on the prediction being successful (this means that θj = 0 if j /∈ K). House’s expected loss
conditional on a successful predictions equals
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈C
Ii(j)σiθj =
∑
i∈K
σiθi,
where we are assuming that the strategy is chosen independently of the chances.
The loss depends on σ , which is chosen by bettor, and on θ . The latter models the specific problem under consideration.
But House knows that the betting system will be applied, in principle, to every possible problem. House should then be
enabled to consider every possible scenario:
(A5) In the determination of the expected loss, House has the freedom to choose any value for θ .
At this point we are ready to derive the extended rewardmatrix (as described at the end of Section 2, and in particular given
in Table 2 for the case of binary classification):
Theorem 1. LetK⊆ Cbe a set-valued prediction made of k classes, IK be the indicator function of setK, and j the actual class.
The corresponding value in the extended reward matrix that is uniquely consistent with (A1)–(A5) is the discounted accuracy:
IK(j)
k
.
Proof. IfK is unsuccessful, then any randomized strategy will yield a zero loss. Let us focus on successful predictions. Let
be the n− 1 probability simplex. We formulate the problem in a game-theoretic setting. The two players are just bettor and
House. Bettor can choose σ ∈ , while House can choose θ ∈ . What we get is a zero-sum game with a gain for bettor
defined by
∑
i∈K σiθi. This is a continuous linear function in σ for all θ ∈ , as well as in θ for all σ ∈ , and moreover 
is a compact convex set. The minimax theorem (see, e.g., [21, Theorem 6.7.3]) allows us to deduce that there is an optimal
solution to the game with expected reward equal to maxσ∈ minθ∈
∑
i∈K σiθi. It is easy to see that the optimal value is
equal to 1/k: once a strategy σ is fixed, the minimum is achieved by setting θi∗ := 1 on any i∗ = argmini∈K σi; then the
problem becomes maxσ∈ mini∈K σi = 1/k. The related optimal strategy σ ∗ is uniform, σ ∗i := 1/k for all i ∈ K; this
means that bettor and House agree that credal bettor should act like theK-random classifier.
Now remember that, according to (A1)–(A2), both bettor and House are risk neutral. This means they agree that an
unsuccessful prediction is rewarded by the certain value 0 and a successful one by the certain value 1/k. This is achieved by
setting the reward equal to the discounted accuracy. 
It is useful to comment on this result from a few different viewpoints.
One thing is that the discounted accuracy implements a kind of least-committal reward system for House, in the sense
that House gives bettor only what is certainly due to it. In fact, if the credal bettor does implement strategy σ ∗, the expected
reward that it achieves is indeed 1/k, irrespective of the chances. Therefore the established reward is what House knows
already that bettor can make for sure. For the same reason, it would be implausible to expect that credal bettor accepts any
smaller reward. It is also interesting to observe that playing as theK-random bettor (i.e., classifier) is the only way for credal
bettor to have a sure reward.
The next consideration is again based on the observation that credal bettor is evaluated exactly as theK-random bettor.
This has important implications for the comparison of classifiers through the discounted accuracy: themain point is that the
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K-random bettor is actually taken as a baseline to compare classifiers. Consider, for the sake of explanation, a determinate
classifier whose output class is always contained in that of a certain credal classifier. The determinate classifier will be
evaluated better than the credal classifier as soon as it exploits, to any (even a very tiny) degree, the credal classifier’s set of
output classes better than the K-random one. Looking at this from another side, it means that the credal classifier can be
better than the determinate one only if the latter behaves worse than theK-random classifier! (Surprisingly, this does not
happen as rarely as one could imagine; see Section 9.1.3 for details.) This discussion should make clear that the discounted
accuracy, although it is a reasonable criterion, is probably themost unfavorableway (among the reasonable ones) to evaluate
credal classifiers, as a credal classifier cannot do better than isolating a set of classes that are impossible to compare.
Thispoints toanaspectof theevaluation that thediscountedaccuracy certainly fails to capture. Letus focuson the simplest
possible setup, using the following example. You are trying to evaluate two physicians based on some recorded diagnostic
performance of theirs. In your records, the first physician always issues a vacuous diagnosis, that is, the entire set C of
possible diseases. The secondalways issues adeterminatediagnosis. Butwhenyoumeasure the secondphysician’s predictive
accuracy, you realize that his predictions are random. In this case, the discounted accuracy values the two physicians the
same: 1/n. But it could be argued that the first physician provides you with something more than the second, because, in a
sense, he delivers what he promises. How to precisely value this ‘something more’ appears to be quite a subjective matter:
someone might value it, and someone else not at all.
It is unlikely that this controversy can be resolved objectively, as perhaps discounted accuracy might suggest: we rather
believe that we should enable our framework to embed subjective considerations of the above type. Discounted accuracy
has been derived by purposely trying to keep subjectivity out of consideration. Now it is time to consider the subjective
aspects of the evaluation. The next section shows that this can be done in a very natural way.
5. Comparing credal classifiers
We have two classifiers f , g. We focus on selecting the classifier whose expected performance in the next instance (i.e.,
next bet) is greater than the other’s. In the previous section we have measured performance by discounted accuracy. In this
section, we want to make the method of comparison more flexible by allowing subjectivity to enter the picture, so as to be
able to deal with the issues discussed at the end of the previous section. To this end, we start identifying classifiers with
gambles: let gambles f and g yield the discounted-accuracy reward achieved by classifiers f and g, respectively, in the next
instance. There is uncertainty about these gambles because we assume that the instance has yet to be sampled.
The comparison of gambles f and g needs a (rational) decision maker, whom we call ‘you’. By definition of the gambles,
you will compare them based on discounted-accuracy rewards. Wemodel your attitude towards these rewards through the
following assumption:
(A6) Your utility, 2 as a function u(·) of the discounted-accuracy rewards, is concave,
which means that you are risk averse, or at most neutral, in these rewards. 3
This seems to be quite a reasonable assumption in the common setupwhere the original rewards (the ones used to define
the 0-1 reward matrix I) are measured in a utility scale that is linear for you. To see this, imagine that you are directly asked
to extend the original reward matrix I to take into account your attitude towards set-valued classifications. Can we say
something about the values you would use to define such an extended matrix? On the one hand, we argue that the rewards
you would put there should be greater than or equal to the discounted-accuracy rewards. This follows from the discussion
at the end of Section 4, which shows that it would be unreasonable to use values smaller than the discounted accuracy. On
the other hand, values strictly greater than that would be reasonable: these allow you to express a preference in favor of a
set-valued classification in comparison to the relatedK-random prediction.
Remember that your utility is linear in the original 0-1 rewards, whence we can assume without loss of generality that
for you it holds that u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1. In addition, the previous argumentation makes it clear that for a set-valued
predictionK containing the actual class, it should only be possible that
u(1/k) ≥ 1/k.
In other words, your utility function turns out to be, in general, a non-linear function of the discounted accuracy rewards.
Saying this differently, we can equivalently regard discounted accuracy as representing a new utility scale in which your
utility function is non-linear. In Assumption (A6) we take your utility in particular to be concave to express a consistent
preference for set-valued classifications in comparison to the related K-random predictions (note that this includes the
extreme case of a linear utility function, in which the two options are equally valued).
2 We assume that the usual regularity conditions for utility hold, and in particular that it is strictly increasing, and that it has first and second derivatives (see,
e.g., [19]).
3 Note that House is not affected by your entering the picture, as it keeps on delivering discounted accuracy rewards as before. What changes is the explicit
introduction of a decision maker and his perception of the value of these rewards, as modeled by your risk aversion.
1288 M. Zaffalon et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 1282–1301
Going back to the comparison of classifiers, it follows immediately from (A6) and decision-theoretic arguments that you
will choose the one with maximum expected utility: h∗ := argmaxh∈{f ,g} E[u(h)].
Re-consider theexampleof thevacuousand the randomclassifier, discussedat theendof Section4, as theyareemblematic
of the differences that arise in the evaluation of credal and precise classifiers when using utility.
Proposition 1. The random and the vacuous classifiers have the same expected reward on the next instance, but the expected
utility of the vacuous is greater under any strictly concave utility function.
Proof. Denote the random classifier by r and the vacuous classifier by v. As usual, we identify the classifiers with the
corresponding gambles, which represent uncertain discounted-accuracy rewards for the next bet. The vacuous classifier
gets on any instance the deterministic reward 1/n. Thus, under any utility function:
E[u(v)] = u
(
1
n
)
= u(E[v]) .
The random classifier r samples the predicted class fromCaccording to the uniformmass function σ ∗, independently of the
actual class. Let us denote, as usual, by θ = (θj)j∈C the vector of chances for the actual classes. We obtain that
E[r] = ∑
i∈C
∑
j∈C
Ii(j)σ
∗
i θj =
∑
i∈C
σ ∗i θi = 1/n .
This shows that E[v] = E[r]. In addition, using Jensen’s inequality leads to
E[u(r)] < u(E[r]) = u (1/n) = E[u(v)] ,
whenever u is a strictly concave function. 
To better analyze this point, it is useful to approximate the expected utility by a second-order Taylor series. Let h be a
generic classifier (and hence, a gamble):
E[u(h)]  u(E[h]) +
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
u′(E[h])E(h − E[h])+1
2
u′′(E[h])E
[
(E[h] − h)2
]
= u(E[h]) + 1
2
u′′(E[h])Var[h] , (1)
where u′, u′′ are the first and second derivatives of the utility function, and Var[h] denotes the variance of h. Well-known
papers in finance [16,18] have shown that this is a very accurate approximation.
Remember that u′′(E[h]) ≤ 0 for every concave utility function (moreover, u′′(·) is related to the degree of risk aversion
of the utility assessor). Therefore what Eq. (1) tells us is that the expected utility increases by increasing the expectation of
rewards and decreasing their variance. It is clear now why the vacuous classifier, with variance equal to zero, is preferred
to the random one. In other words, the ‘something more’ that the vacuous classifier is providing is its inherent reliability in
earning rewards, which, using discounted accuracy, has a very clear numerical counterpart in its variance. The value that you
give to this is indeed personal, and is formalized through your utility function. In the extreme case when you are risk neutral
in the discounted-accuracy rewards, the value is zero, and in this case there seems to be little room for credal classifiers in
your interests. Bigger values express stronger preferences for reliable predictions.
All the above considerations can be turned into a remarkably simple procedure to empirically compare credal classifiers
in practice. Remember that in a classification problem we usually have a test set T, that is, a collection of instances used to
evaluate the performance of a classifier. We need to estimate E[u(h)] for a certain classifier h. Let us denote by U the set of
values that gamble u(h) can take. SetUhas (2n − 1) × n elements at most, as the values are in one-to-one correspondence
with the elements of the reward matrix extended through discounted accuracy (as in Table 2). If we estimate the chance of
a value uh ∈ Uby its sample proportion #(uh)/|T| in the test set, we obtain:
E[u(h)]  ∑
uh∈U
uh
#(uh)
|T| =
1
|T|
∑
(a,c)∈T
u(h(a, c)).
This is equivalent to evaluating the performance of a credal classifier using the (2n − 1) × n reward matrix obtained by
applying function u(·) point-wise to thematrix extended through discounted accuracy. As an example, the extended reward
matrix in Table 2 should be transformed into that in Table 3. In other words, what is done in practice is to change the
‘discounting’ factor in the discounted accuracy bymeans of the concave utility function. For this reason, we call the resulting
metric ‘utility-discounted (predictive) accuracy’. 4
4 Consider that the performance index obtained through the application of utility to the extended reward matrix need not be in the range [0, 1] in general; in
this case it cannot be interpreted as an accuracy index. To bring the measure back to a predictive accuracy index (although one that is biased through the utility
function in order to take into account your personal preferences), the above comparison can be made, more conveniently, using u−1(E[u(h)]) (that is, by the
so-called certainty equivalent). (See also Section 9; in that case the utility functions we define naturally lead to extended reward matrices with values in [0, 1].)
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Table 3
The extended rewardmatrix in Table 2modified through your utility of discounted
accuracy.
Actual class
1 2
Predicted class
1 u(1) u(0)
2 u(0) u(1)
{1, 2} u(0.5) u(0.5)
6. A digression: betting with money
Beforemoving on tomore technical questions, it is useful to lookback onemore time at theutility-discounted accuracywe
are proposing.We do this by briefly overviewing an alternative interpretation of themetric that offers a different viewpoint.
We started the discussion in Section 2 assuming that the rewards are measured in a utility scale that is linear for you.
We did so because this appears to be the standard assumption made in classification (even though it is often left implicit).
On the other hand, the development of utility-discounted accuracy can be made simpler by assuming that the rewards are
given usingmoney. This means assuming that a successful determinate prediction earns you 1 unit of a given currency (such
as dollars), and that you earn nothing otherwise.
Using money simplifies the treatment because it allows us to focus only on House. House is, as before, an artificial
entity that delivers rewards—this time using money. House’s aim is only to reward correct predictions, and for this reason
Assumption (A2) still holds. Initially House sets the rewards for the determinate bets, thus making up matrix I. Then House
wants to allow for set-valued bets, and wonders how to associate a reward to them in a fair way. The discussion in Section 4
can be re-phrased to this end so as to show that the discounted accuracy implements the fair way to reward bettors that
House is looking for: in fact, from House’s viewpoint, it would be unfair to reward a bettor with less than the discounted
accuracy, because the bettor could obtain the same average amount ofmoney in the limit by playing as theK-randombettor;
on the other hand, deliveringmore than the discounted accuracywould give an unfair advantage to the bettor, because there
is no way for him to surely make a gain bigger than the discounted accuracy in general.
By doing this, House fixes the rewards for any type of bet, determinate and indeterminate. At this point, you want to bet
with House. Remember that House gives rewards in money. It is a widely accepted assumption that people are risk averse
in money rewards. This means that your utility, as a function of money, is concave; whence Assumption (A6), properly
re-phrased for the present setup, holds. The rest of the discussion in Section 5 holds here as well.
In otherwords, in themoney-based framework, utility-discounted accuracy follows from twoquite natural requirements:
setting up a fair way to reward set-valued predictions on the basis of the rewards of determinate ones; and taking into
consideration that you are risk averse in money rewards. Apart from the inherent simplicity of the money-based setup, it
is remarkable that such a setup makes it immediately clear that there is a large overlap between the evaluation of credal
classifiers and finance. In this light, it is not surprising that a well-known formula in finance, such as (1), holds also in the
present setup. In finance, such a formula states that an investor usuallywants to decrease the risk of an uncertain gain besides
increasing the gain itself. With credal classifiers, such a formula states that one might want to go for weaker predictions
in order to increase their reliability. Underlying both views is the idea that there is a value in reducing variability: using
indeterminate predictions is a principled way to do so in classification.
We end the discussion aboutmoney rewards here; in the next sectionswe take up again themain thread of the discussion,
concerned in particular with rewards expressed in a utility scale that is linear for you. This notwithstanding, it is useful to
keep in mind that also the next developments can be re-casted in terms of money-based rewards.
7. The case for an objective winner
Eq. (1) is useful because it gives us a very accurate approximation to the expected utility while releasing us from having
our considerations narrowed down by the specific form of the utility function considered. To this end, in the following, we
will repeatedly refer to (1) as if it were our actual expected utility.
In particular, an interesting consideration suggested by Eq. (1) is that in one case the comparison of classifiers can be done
by minimizing subjective considerations: when the two classifiers have equal expected reward. In this case, the classifier
with minimum variance wins under every strictly concave utility function: that is, no matter how tiny (but non-zero) is
your degree of risk aversion. This can be implemented in practice by defining a range where the difference of the expected
rewards is deemed irrelevant, and estimating their variances from the test set.
In the following, we investigate whether we can relate the variance of a classifier with its determinacy, that is, with
a measure of the amount of imprecision in the output. Intuitively, we expect such a relationship to exist because both
measures are related to the reliability of a classifier, and moreover, we expect that larger indeterminacy corresponds to
smaller variance.
The gamble h corresponding to a classifier’s performance in the next bet can be decomposed into two other gambles hD
and hI such that h = hD +hI and hDhI = 0 (element-wise). Intuitively, hD and hI represent the rewards for hwhen it returns,
respectively, a determinate and an indeterminate classification. The following relationships follow from the decomposition
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under discounted accuracy:
E[h2] = E[h2D] + E[h2I ], E[h2D] = E[hD], E[hI] ≥ E[h2I ],
where in the last expressionwe have the equality only if E[hI] = E[h2I ] = 0, which implies that either h is a precise classifier
or that indeterminate predictions of h contain the actual class with probability zero.
Let f and g denote two generic classifiers with the same expected discounted accuracy: E[f ] = E[g]. Using the identities
above, one can show that the difference of variances is thus
Var := Var[g] − Var[f ] = E[gD] + E[g2I ] − E[fD] − E[f 2I ]. (2)
Let us start by considering the important case where we compare a credal classifier with a precise one:
Proposition 2. Consider a credal classifier and a precise classifier with the same expected reward. Then the credal classifier is
preferable to the precise classifier under any strictly concave utility function.
Proof. Let us denote by f the credal classifier and by g the precise one. We know by Eq. (1) that we prefer the classifier with
smaller variance under any strictly concave utility function. Thus, it suffices to show that Var ≥ 0. Since E[f 2I ] ≤ E[fI], it
follows from Eq. (2) that Var = E[gD] − E[fD] − E[f 2I ] so that
Var ≥ E[gD] − E[fD] − E[fI] = E[g] − E[f ],
which equals zero, since f and g have equal expected reward. Note the inequality is strict (i.e., there is strict preference) if
the credal classifier is not always determinate and its indeterminate predictions are successful with positive probability. 
Now, let HD be the event that equals 1 when the generic classifier h is determinate on the next instance, and 0 otherwise.
We define the determinacy of classifier h as the probability that h is determinate: P(HD). This definition allows us to settle
the problem for the next case:
Proposition 3. Consider two credal classifiers that are vacuouswhenever they are indeterminate and that have the same expected
reward. Then the more indeterminate classifier is preferable under any strictly concave utility function.
Proof. Let us denote by f and g the two credal classifiers, assuming f to be more indeterminate than g: P(GD) > P(FD). It
suffices to show that Var > 0. Any generic classifier h that is vacuous whenever it is indeterminate is rewarded with 1/n
for any indeterminate prediction. Hence,
E[hI] = 1 − P(HD)
n
, E[h2I ] =
E[hI]
n
.
From these identities and Eq. (2) we have that
Var = E[gD] + E[gI]/n − E[fD] − E[fI]/n
= −E[gI] + E[gI]/n + E[fI] − E[fI]/n
= n − 1
n
(−E[gI] + E[fI]) = n − 1
n2
(P(GD) − P(FD)) ,
which is strictly positive by the initial assumptions. 
This proposition is particularly useful as it allows us to solve the problem in the case of binary classification problems,
where any indeterminate prediction is necessarily vacuous.
One might be tempted to think that the previous result extends to non-vacuous classifiers as well, that is, the more
determinate a classifier the higher its variance (and therefore the less preferable it is). Unfortunately, this is not the case, as
the following example shows.
Example 1. Consider a three-class classification problem and let f and g be two credal classifiers. Let Hk denote the event
that equals 1 if the generic classifier h returns a set of k classes that contains the actual one, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, let
Hck be the event that equals 1 if h outputs k incorrect classes, and 0 otherwise. Note that
∑3
k=1 Hk +Hck = 1 and Hc3 = 0. We
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can define the relevant expectations in terms of Hk,H
c
k:
P(HD) = P(H1) + P(Hc1), E[h] =
3∑
k=1
1
k
P(Hk),
E[h2] =
3∑
k=1
1
k2
P(Hk), 1 =
3∑
k=1
P(Hk) + P(Hck).
Assume that P(F1) = P(G1) + ε, P(Gc1) = P(Fc1) + 2ε, P(G2) = P(F2) + 2ε, P(Fc2) = P(Gc2) + 3ε, and P(F3) = P(G3), for
some small ε > 0. Then we have from the identities above that E[f ] = E[g]. Similarly, we have that E[f 2] = E[g2] + ε
2
.
Hence,Var = E[g2] − E[f 2] < 0, and g is preferred over f even though g is more determinate than f : P(FD) = P(GD)− ε.
Alternatively, we might measure the indeterminacy of a classifier h by the expected number of classes it outputs:∑n
k=1 k
[
P(Hk) + P(Hck)
]
. Thus, in the example, we would have
n∑
k=1
k
[
P(Fk) + P(Fck)
] = n∑
k=1
k
[
P(Gk) + P(Gck)
] + 4ε,
and g is preferred over f even though the former has a smaller expected number of outputs than the latter.
8. Comparison over the nextm bets
So far, we have considered the expected reward and utilities for the next single classification; this setting fits for instance
the case of a patient, who asks a doctor for a diagnosis and who is concerned only about the utility generated by the very
next classification (his diagnosis). Conversely, an online trader, who performsm trading operations every day, might accept
to lose some money in the very next transaction, provided that the set of m transactions generated at the end of day has
high enough utility. In this case, expected rewards and expected utilities should be computed over the next m bets. In the
following, we compare the random classifier r and the vacuous classifier v on the nextm bets; we denote by vm and rm the
rewards of the vacuous and the random ones over the nextm instances.
Gamble vm has deterministic valuem/n and thus:
E[u(vm)] = u
(
m
n
)
.
To compute E[u(rm)], let us consider that classifier r yields utility u() when it correctly predicts  outcomes in the nextm
bets; considering that classifier r issues a correct classification with probability 1/n (see Proposition 1), the probability of
correctly predicting  instances out of the nextm is the binomial:
Bin(,m,
1
n
) =
(

m
)
1
n
 (
1 − 1
n
)m−
.
The expected utility produced by the random classifier over the nextm bets is thus:
E[u(rm)] =
m∑
=1
u()Bin
(
,m,
1
n
)
. (3)
Comparison of expected utilities of the random and vacuous classifiers cannot be immediately accomplished using only
Eq. (3); a clear understanding can be obtained through the second-order approximation given by Eq. (1). In the following,
we analyze in this way the logarithmic and the exponential utility. The second-order approximation of both the logarithmic
and the exponential utility is very good, having relative absolute error consistently smaller than 1%.
8.1. Logarithmic utility
The logarithmic utility is u(x) := log(1 + x), whence u′′(x) = − 1
(1+x)2 ; applying Eq. (1), we get:
u(E[rm]) + 1
2
u′′(E[rm])Var(rm) = u(E[rm]) − Var(rm)
2(E[rm] + 1)2 = u
(
m
n
)
− m
1
n
(
1 − 1
n
)
2
(
m
n
+ 1
)2 ,
where in the last passage we introduced the analytical expression of the variance for a binomial distribution.
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Thus, the (approximated) difference between the expected utility of the random and the vacuous over the nextm bets is
d(m) := E[u(vm)] − E[u(rm)] =
m
n
(
1 − 1
n
)
2
(
m
n
+ 1
)2 ∝ m(m
n
+ 1
)2 , (4)
where in the last passage we removed the proportionality constant 1
2n
(
1 − 1
n
)
> 0. Function d(m) is shown in Fig. 1.
The first derivative of d(m) is:
d′(m) = 1(
m
n
+ 1
)2 − 2
m
n(
m
n
+ 1
)3 ∝ 1 − mn , (5)
where the last passage is obtained considering that
(
m
n
+ 1
)3
> 0. From Eqs. (4) and (5), we can figure out that d(m)
will monotonically increase up to m < n (inversion point), to then indefinitely decrease, so that d(m) → 0 for m → ∞; if
expectations of utilities are computed over a long enoughnumber of bets, the expected utility produced by the two classifiers
is the same. It also follows that increasing n delays the convergence of the expected utilities to the same value, as also shown
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Function d(m) for logarithmic utility, under different number of classes.
8.2. Exponential utility
The exponential utility is u(x) := 1 − exp(−ax), where a is a coefficient of risk aversion. Noting that u′′(x) =
−a2 exp(−ax), the second-order approximation yields:
u(E[rm]) + 1
2
u′′
(
m
n
)
Var(rm) = u
(
m
n
)
− 1
2
a2 exp
(
−am
n
)
m
1
n
(
1 − 1
n
)
,
whence
d(m) = −1
2
a2 exp
(
−am
n
)
m
1
n
(
1 − 1
n
)
∝ − exp
(
−am
n
)
m,
where the proportionality constant is a
2
2
1
n
(
1 − 1
n
)
> 0.
We have
d′(m) = exp
(
−am
n
)
·
(
a
m
n
− 1
)
.
Function d(m) has qualitatively the same behavior of the logarithmic case, but the inversion point is now located atm = n
a
.
Moreover, the difference between the expected utility of the two classifiers depends also on the risk-aversion coefficient a;
higher risk aversion delays the convergence of the expected utilities, thus emphasizing the difference in favor of the vacuous
on smallm.
9. Experiments
Toexperimentally assess theperformanceof a credal classifier,weneedautility function tobeappliedon topofdiscounted
accuracy. Let us fix the utility of a correct and determinate classification as u(1) := 1 and the utility of a wrong classification
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Fig. 2. The three quadratic utility functions obtained for different values of u(0.5). The function corresponding to discounted accuracy is u50.
(determinate or indeterminate) as u(0) := 0; this is consistent with the assumption that you are risk neutral in the scale of
the original rewards.
Let us initially consider the case of a binary classification problem. To fully specify the utility function, we have to define
the valueofu(0.5).Withu(0.5) = 0.5, theutility leads to the standarddiscounted accuracymeasure. Risk-aversion increases
as u(0.5) increases. We assume that in case of risk aversion, u(0.5) can reasonably lie between 0.65 and 0.8; we call u65 and
u80 the utility functions corresponding to these choices, and u50 the one related to discounted accuracy.
In order to deal with classification problems with more than two classes, we adopt a quadratic utility function, which
passes through u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1, and u(0.5) = 0.65 or u(0.5) = 0.80. The two utility functions are:
u65(x) = −1.2x2 + 2.2x, u80(x) = −0.6x2 + 1.6x,
where x denotes the discounted accuracy of the issued classification. These functions are shown in Fig. 2. Note that u80 is
slightly greater than 1 for some x between 0.5 and 1; however, this part of the function is never used, as discounted accuracy
cannot assume values between 0.5 and 1. This means that the range of values returned by all the functions will be [0, 1],
which will allow us to interpret the resulting utility-discounted accuracies indeed as predictive accuracies (even though
they are biased accuracies so as to take into account your personal preferences).
A well-known drawback of the quadratic utility function is that it models the risk aversion as increasing with wealth.
Yet, at least under particular conditions, quadratic and exponential utility result in very similar choices [3]. Moreover, using
quadratic utility has the advantage to make Eq. (1) an exact representation of the utility function, whose effects can then be
interpreted very clearly as due to a compromise between increasing gain and reducing variability. We considered using the
exponential utility too, but we eventually discarded it as it could not satisfactorily fit all the values we chose for u(0.5).
9.1. NBC versus NCC
In this sectionwe focus the comparisonon twowell-knownclassifiers: naiveBayes classifier (NBC [10]) as a representative
of precise classifiers, and the naive credal classifier (NCC [25,26,6]). In particular, we compare the expected utility generated
by NBC and NCC on the next single bet, namely on a single instance.
9.1.1. Artificial data sets
In a first set of experiments, we generated artificial data sets consisting of binary class and 10 binary features; we set
the marginal chances of classes as uniform, while we drew the conditional chances of the features under the constraint
|θi1 − θi2| ≥ 0.1 ∀i, j, where θij denotes the chance of feature Ai to be in state  when C = j; the constraint forced each
feature to be strongly dependent on the class. We drew θ 80 times uniformly at random and we considered the sample
sizes: s ∈ {25, 50, 100}. We did not consider larger sample sizes, under which NCC would have been almost completely
determinate, and thus not really different from NBC. For each pair (θ, s) we generated 50 training sets; we then evaluated
the trained classifiers on a test set of 10000 instances. In the following, the instances indeterminately classified by NCC are
referred to as the area of ignorance. For each sample size, we thus perform 80 (#(θ)) × 50 (trials) = 4000 training/test
experiments. In these experiments, we only consider the u65 utility function.
As it can be seen in Fig. 3, the discounted accuracy of NBC is higher than the discounted accuracy of NCC; this means
that, on the area of ignorance, NBC is doing better than theK-random guesser, namely the classifier which picks the class at
random from among those returned by NCC. Note that for NBC there is no distinction between accuracy and utility. However,
NCC produces higher expected utility than NBC at each sample size, even under the conservative choice u65.
9.1.2. Experiments with downsampling
We then performed some experiments on the kr-vs-kp data set from the UCI repository. It is a binary data set, in which
the two classes are evenly distributed; it contains 36 binary features and 3200 instances. We downsampled the data set,
generating training sets of size s ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50, 100, 150}. For each sample size, we sampled 100 different training
sets; the test setwas given by the instances left in the original data set. Again, we considered the conservative choice u65. The
average results are shown in Fig. 4. The determinacy of NCC (not shown) steadily increases with the sample size, as well as
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Fig. 3. Experimental results with artificial data; each point shows the median over 4000 experiments, performed with the same sample size s. For NBC, accuracy
and utility coincide.
Fig. 4. Result of experiments with downsampling.
the discounted accuracy of NCC and the accuracy of NBC. For very small sample sizes, NCC is almost always indeterminate;
in this case, its utility corresponds to u(0.5) and thus is 0.65; in the same situation NBC is only slightly better than random
guessing. The expected utility of both NBC and NCC increases with the sample size; that of NCC remains however slightly
superior. By adopting the u80 function instead of the u65, the advantage of NBC would have obviously been more evident.
9.1.3. Experiments with real data sets
To get a more comprehensive picture of the performances of NBC and NCC, we performed experiments with 55 public
data sets from the UCI repository; the number of classes varies from 2 to 26, the number of features from 2 to 36, the number
of instances from 24 to more than 10000. Wewill consider this collection of data sets also in the next sections. On each data
set, we performed ten runs of ten-fold cross validation. To compare two classifiers on thewhole collection of data sets, 5 we
used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, as recommended by [8]. All tests are performed with α := 0.05.
Since NCC operates only on discrete data, each data set has been discretized using the MDL-based discretization [12];
this approach determines for each feature variable the number of bins and the span of each bin, in a way which is optimal
according to the minimum description length criterion. The discretization bins are thus learned from data; they are learned
from the training set and applied unchanged to the test set.
Under the risk-neutral utility (i.e., discounted accuracy), the accuracy of NBC was higher than the discounted accuracy
of NCC in 32 the data sets, while the converse held on 23 data sets. This difference in favor of NBC, as an aggregate measure
over the 55 data sets, was statistically significant. This indicates that NBC most often performs better than the K-random
guesser on the instances where NCC is indeterminate; surprisingly, it also happens to perform worse in several data sets.
However, no significant difference was found under u65 and under u80, when comparing the expected utility produced by
NCC and NBC over the collection of data sets. The expected utilities of NBC and NCC on each data set under u65 and u80
are compared in Fig. 5 (left column) through scatter plots. The straight line in the figures represents equal expected utility
performance. Points above the line indicate cases where NBC outperformed NCC; conversely, points below the line indicate
cases where NCC outperformed NBC. The plots show a slight increase of the expected utility of NCC as we move from u65 to
u80, as expected.
Themedian accuracy of NBCwas 82%, while themedian expected utility of NCC vary from 75% under linear utility to 78%
under u65 to 81% under u80, suggesting that, as expected, NCC’s performance improves as we increase risk aversion. On 33
out of the 55 data sets, NCC had a determinacy higher than 90%, indicating that, in most of the data sets, NCC issued few
indeterminate predictions. The median determinacy was 0.95.
NCC faces difficulties when the contingency table induced from a data set contains many zero counts, which causes NCC
to be excessively indeterminate. Several such data sets are comprised in our collection. In these cases, restricting the credal
set of NCC can largely increase the expected utility of NCC [4]; however, this is outside the scope of this paper.
5 This means that the possible significance of a comparison is related to the overall performance on the collection of data sets, rather than on a data set by data
set basis.
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Fig. 5. Scatter plots comparing NBC and NCC on the 55 data sets.
However, in order to mitigate such problems, we repeated the experiments after pre-processing each data sets with
a correlation-based feature selection algorithm. This is anyway a sensible approach, since naive classifiers are negatively
affected by redundant features. The scatter plots after feature selection are shown in the right column of Fig. 5; after feature
selection, NBC and NCC performed much more similarly. In fact, feature selection increases the determinacy of NCC: on 37
data sets NCC had a determinacy higher than 90%. Thus, it is not surprising that NBC and NCC exhibit similar performance
in most of the data sets. However, NCC shows in this case a better performance than NBC; in particular:
• under u65: NCC has higher expected utility in 37 data sets, NBC in 28; this difference was not significant;• under u80: NCC has higher expected utility in 42 data sets, NBC in 13; this difference was significant.
As last analysis, we compared the expected utility produced by the two classifiers only on the instances indeterminately
classified. This comparison is meaningful, since on the instances determinately classified the two classifiers return the
same classes. Under u65, NCC produces on the indeterminately classified instances, an expected utility that is, averaging
over all data sets, about 9% greater than that produced by NBC on the same instances; the 95% confidence interval of this
improvement is 1–19%. Under u80, NCC produces on the indeterminately classified instances, an expected utility which is,
averaging over all data sets, about 36% greater than that produced byNBC on the same instances; the 95% confidence interval
of this improvement is 24–48%. These values refer to the casewhen feature selection is applied; they show that it is beneficial
to suspend the judgment on the instances identified as doubtful by NCC. Yet, feature selection seems important to exploit
the maximum potential of NCC, which otherwise might suffer from excessive indeterminacy.
9.2. Experiments with credal classifiers
We performed experiments with different credal classifiers implemented in Weka-IP, which is a free6 plugin for credal
classification that extends the functionalities of the open-source WEKA software [24] for data mining. The classifiers we
considered are NCC, Lazy Naive Credal Classifier (LNCC) [7], Credal Model Averaging (CMA) [5], Credal Decision Tree (CDT)
[1,2]: LNCC is a lazy version of NCC that on each instance to classify selects the subset of the training setwhich ismore similar
to such an instance and learns anNCC using only that subset; CMA is an extension to imprecise probability of Bayesianmodel
averaging, which imprecisely averages over different NBC classifiers, each characterized by a different feature set; CDT is an
extension to imprecise probability of the classification trees, which uses imprecise probability for both deciding on which
feature to branch and for classifying the instances.
We used the quadratic utility functions in Fig. 2 tomeasure the sensitivity of the classifiers’ performance to risk aversion.
Tables 4 and 5 contain themedian expected utility andmedian determinacy, respectively, of the classifiers over all data sets.
6 See http://decsai.ugr.es/∼andrew/weka-ip.html.
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Table 4
Median expected utility of credal classifiers.
Utility NCC LNCC CMA CDT
u50 0.75 0.77 0.81 0.79
u65 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.79
u80 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.80
Table 5
Median determinacy (in %) of credal classifiers on the data sets.
NCC LNCC CMA CDT
95.03 97.90 99.56 97.49
Table 6
Mean relative rank of credal classifiers on the data sets.
Utility NCC LNCC CMA CDT
u50 3.05 2.48 2.28 2.18
u65 2.81 2.54 2.47 2.18
u80 2.56 2.48 2.59 2.36
Fig. 6. Nemenyi test for pairwise comparison of credal classifiers.
From these tables, it is possible to see that CMA is the more determinate (in terms of median) of the classifiers, and also
the one with highest expected utility. Likewise, NCC is the more indeterminate of the classifiers and it is also the one that
benefits most from the increase of risk aversion: the increase in expected utility is greater for NCC than for other classifiers.
CDT, on the other hand, seems to take little advantage on the increase of risk aversion.
To evaluatewhether therewas a statistically significant difference between the performance of classifiers across data sets,
we performed a Friedman test as suggested by Demsar [8]. The mean relative ranks per utility function appear in Table 6. 7
The tests found a significant difference under the risk-neutral utility function (i.e., discounted accuracy), but no significant
difference under any of the risk-averse utility functions (u65 and u80). We then applied a Nemenyi test to detect significant
improvements between pairs of classifiers under the risk-neutral utility function. The result of the test is shown in Fig. 6.
7 For each data set, we assign rank 1 to the classifier with highest expected utility, 2 to the classifier with the second highest expected utility, and so on. The
mean relative rank is then the average of the ranks of a classifier over all data sets.
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Fig. 7. Scatter plots comparing each credal classifier’s performance with and without feature selection. According to the Wilcoxon test, feature selection yields a
significant improvement for NCC (p <0.05), while for the other classifiers the difference is not statistically significant.
Each segment represents an interval of significance for a classifier, with its center denoting the classifier’smean relative rank.
A classifier X is significantly outperformed by a classifier Y if X ’s corresponding segment appears on the right of Y ’s segment
and the two segments do not overlap. This is the case of NCC and CMA, and NCC and CDT, but not of any of the pairs NCC and
LNCC, LNCC and CMA, LNCC and CDT, or CMA and CDT. In other words, NCC is significantly outperformed by CMA and CDT
under the risk-neutral utility, but no other significant differencewas observed among other pairs of classifiers; note however
than under u65 the segments of CDT and NCC barely overlap, meaning that CDT was close to be declared significantly better
than NCC.
All in all, among the four credal classifiers we tested, none consistently outperformed all others when risk aversion is
taken into account.
9.2.1. Feature selection
Feature selection identifies a representative subset of features out of all the available ones; feature selection thus aims
at reducing the dimensionality of the data while improving the classification performance [24]. In this section we verify by
means of the utility-based metric the effect of feature selection on the performance of credal classifiers; previously such an
assessment could have been done only heuristically, given the lack of a principled metric for assessing the performance of
credal classifiers.
We adopt the correlation-based feature selection [14], which is well known and available into WEKA. Experiments with
traditional classifiers have shown that this technique is generally beneficial for naive Bayes, since it effectively removes
redundant attributes; on the other hand, it might even slightly worsen the performance of classification trees.
The plots in Fig. 7 show the performance of each credal classifierwith andwithout feature selection, under the utility u65.
As expected, correlation-based feature selection is beneficial for NCC and LNCC; it has instead a slightly negative impact on
CDT. The performance of CMA is almost equivalent with or without feature selection, most likely since CMA is an extension
of Bayesian model averaging, which already automatically performs feature selection on its own; thus, adding an external
feature selection step does not make a big difference.
Overall, credal classifiers are affected by feature selection similarly to the traditional classifiers they derive from. This is
a simple conclusion, which nevertheless could be hardly stated without a sound metric for evaluating credal classifiers.
9.3. Comparison with the non-deterministic classifier of Del Coz et al. (2009)
It is interesting to consider classifiers that return set-valued classifications and that have been developed without taking
imprecision of probability into account. In this section, we consider the non-deterministic classifier of [17] (NDC). This
algorithm can be applied on top of any probabilistic classifier; it analyzes the posterior probability and decides whether to
return a single class or a set of classes. Such algorithm thus works with a single posterior distribution, rather than with a
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Table 7
Scores of different predictions, assuming the actual class to be 1.
Prediction Precision (d. acc.) Recall F1 F2 u65 u80
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
{1, 2} 0.5 1 0.67 0.83 0.65 0.80
{1, 2, 3} 0.33 1 0.50 0.71 0.47 0.60
{2, 3, 4} 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 8. Comparison of F-metrics and quadratic utility functions.
posterior credal set. We implemented it to run on top of the NBC, so as to compare it against NCC: in this case, NCC and NDC
can be seen as two alternatives for generating set-valued classifications with a naive classifier.
TheNDC classifier optimizes the expected F-measure of the issued classification. The F-measure is ametric devisedwithin
the field of Information Retrieval and defined as the harmonic average of recall and precision. Let K ⊆ C be a set-valued
predictionmade of k classes and IK the indicator function ofK, namelywhether it contains or not the actual class. The recall
(r) and the precision (p) are defined as:
r(K) := IK, p(K) := IK
k
.
Thus, recall corresponds to whether or not a prediction is successful; precision corresponds to discounted accuracy. The
F-measure Fβ is defined as:
Fβ(K) := (1 + β
2)pr
β2p + r .
The most common choices for β are β = 1 or β = 2, yielding respectively the F1 and F2 measures. In Table 7 we provide
some examples comparing F1 and F2 measures with u65 and u80.
A graphical comparison of the functions F1, F2, u65 and u80 is given in Fig. 8; it shows that F1 is comprised, for any value
of k, between u65 and u80, while F2 rewards the indeterminate classifications much more than the other functions; this can
be realized also from Table 7.
Thus the F-measure can be meaningfully interpreted, when dealing with indeterminate classifiers, as a utility function
for set-valued classifications. In order to apply the NDC algorithm, the user should specify the value of β; we adopt β := 1,
as F1 is closer to both u65 and u80 than F2.
A comparison between NCC and NDC (applied on top of NBC) has been already carried out in [17] considering UCI data
sets and bioinformatics data sets, and reporting an overall superiority of NDC over NCC. It is somehow expected for NCC
not to perform very well on raw bioinformatics data sets, which are characterized by several thousands of features and only
some tenths of instances: they typically induce contingency tables with many zero counts, which make NCC excessively
cautious; this issue is named the feature problem in [4].
Thus, we work with the collection of UCI data sets already considered in the previous sections. On each data set, we
performed 10 runs of ten-fold cross-validation and eventually compared the performance of the two classifiers through a
paired t-test. To complete the analysis, we then compared the performance of the two classifiers on the whole collection of
data sets through the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. All tests were performed with α := 0.05. As utility functions we consider
u65, u80 and F1.
Fig. 9 compares NCC and NDC through scatter plots. The scatter plot of determinacy is very spread, showing that the
two classifiers differently identify the instances over which to suspend the judgment. In fact, NCC is concerned with the
sensitivity of the posterior distribution to the choice of the prior while NDC is concerned, grossly simplifying, with whether
the probability of the most probable class is high enough. For instance NCC becomes more determinate as the sample size
increases; this is not necessarily the case for NDC. Moreover, NCC becomes generally more indeterminate as the number
of features increases [6]; on the contrary, NDC becomes less indeterminate in these cases, since an increased number of
features emphasizes the ‘probability overshooting’ [15] phenomenon that characterizes naive classifiers.
M. Zaffalon et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 1282–1301 1299
Fig. 9. Scatter plots comparing NCC and NDC on 55 data sets.
Table 8
Comparison of NCC and NDC on the collection of data sets under various utilities.
Utility NCC wins ties NDC wins
u65 21 14 18
F1 20 16 17
u80 14 13 26
The scatter plots of u65, u80, F1 show a certain balance between the two classifiers. However, a bunch of data sets can
be spotted, in which NCC is clearly outperformed; such data sets are indeed characterized by zero counts. Apart from those
cases, the performance of the two classifiers appears quite balanced. This is also confirmed by the statistics of wins, ties and
losses shown in Table 8. The performance of two classifiers on the whole collection of data sets is statistically different, in
favor of NDC, only in the case of u80. One might wonder why NDC, being designed to maximize F1, outperforms NCC under
u80 and not under F1. As pointed out in [17], for a given β˜ , NDC achieves the best performance under Fβ˜ not necessarily using
β = β˜ within its internal objective function.
Overall, NCC andNDC represent two very different approaches to yield indeterminate classifications. A nice characteristic
of NDC is that it tunes its output according to the utility function being used; although in [17] this is done only for F1 and
F2, with some further effort it should be possible to extend it also to more general utility functions. On the other hand,
such an approach cannot identify prior-dependent classifications, which are clearly fragile. This is related to the discussion
presented in the next section.
9.4. Utility-discounted accuracy vs. rejection option
The discussion in the previous section gives us the opportunity to comment on a related question, which is concerned
with classifiers based on the rejection option. These are (usually) precise classifiers that do not classify an instance if the
posterior probability of the optimal class is less than a fixed threshold t. Thus any determinate classifier that computes the
posterior probabilities over the classes can easily be enabled to implement the rejection option. As we have mentioned in
Section 9.3, also the NDC is close in spirit to a classifier based on the rejection option, although it cannot be just reduced to
that.
To make things easier in the following discussion, we focus on a very simple setup. We consider a binary classification
problem with C= {1, 2}; moreover, we assume that the class variable is independent of the feature variables, and that the
population proportion (that is, the chance, or true probability) for class 1 equals 0.7. This means that the best one can hope
for is to correctly classify 70% of the instances.
Now assume that we implement the rejection option on the NBC, and that we select t := 0.8. This would turn the NBC
into an indeterminate classifier, call it NBCt , becausewe could identify themissing classificationwith the vacuous prediction{1, 2}. How would this classifier compare with the NCC, under utility-discounted accuracy?
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Assume that we evaluate the classifiers under u80; assume moreover that the learning set is large enough to make both
the NCC and the NBC learn the true probabilities very accurately, so that they become nearly indistinguishable. This means
that, in those stationary conditions, the NCCwill correctly predict 70% of the instances in the test set, and hence its expected
utility will be 0.7 too. On the other hand, in the same conditions, the NBCt will constantly output the vacuous prediction{1, 2}, simply because in the consideredproblema class cannot haveprobability larger thanor equal to 0.8. As a consequence,
the expected utility of NBCt will be 0.8. The outcome of the comparison will then be in favor of NBCt , even more so as the
comparison will become more and more stable as the test set grows larger.
Even though the occurrence of a situation like the one described is fully consistent with the development we did of our
utility-based metric, one could still be puzzled. In fact, on the one hand, it is correct that NBCt scores better than NCC in
case your risk aversion is expressed by u80: for you just prefer the vacuous prediction to a determinate prediction with
probability 0.7. On the other hand, if our aim is to fairly compare classifiers, perhaps we should consider that the outcome
of the comparison is not determined by a fault of NCC, but rather by the characteristics of the problem: in fact, NCC did learn
from the data everything that could be learned.
More technically speaking, one should consider that the rejection option can be understood as a way to deal with cost-
sensitive classification issues without introducing rewards other than 0-1 (as in matrix I). In fact, decision theory prescribes
that the optimal choice of a class under matrix I is the one that maximizes the posterior probability. Why should then one
avoid selecting such a class, as in the case of the rejection option? The underlying motivation is that one has in mind a
reward matrix different from I: a matrix in which a wrong classification is penalized more than what happens using I. For
this reason, it is perceived that it is better not to issue a classication when the posterior probability of the class is not high
enough.
This suggests that the classifiers based on the rejection option do not fully complywith the framework that we have been
developing, because a founding assumption of our framework is that I is the chosen reward matrix. Therefore, in order to
make the comparison fair, it might be considered to exclude the classifiers that are based on some kind of rejection option.
Another option could be to compare the classifiers based on the rejection option only with one another. For instance,
in the previous example problem, one could think of turning the NCC also into a classifier based on the rejection option: it
would be sufficient to require it (in addition to its usual way of operating) to issue a vacuous classification whenever the
maximum lower posterior probability over the classes does not exceed t.
Issues like the ones described could in fact have affected the comparison between NCC and NDC in the previous section:
for instance, that NDC exhibits a remarkable improvement in the passage from u65 to u80, could be an indication that some
‘threshold’ issue is at work there. As discussed above, a way to make a safer comparison between NCC and NDC, could be to
enable NCC to group sets of classes based not only on its usual way of operating, but also according to the fact that the lower
probability of a group of classes is high enough. Alternatively, this could be regarded as an extension of NDC to imprecision.
10. Conclusions
In this paper, we have tackled what we regard to be a very important, and conceptually involved, open problem: the
empirical comparison of classifiers that issue set-valued (or indeterminate) predictions. We have proposed a newmetric to
this end, which has been derived in a principled way from a number of assumptions.
Our metric has shown itself to be based of two main, and opposing, components: the discounted accuracy, which repre-
sents a kind of objective performance of a classifier; and its variance, which represents the unreliability of the classifier, and
whose contribution to the overall measure has to be weighted through subjective considerations of risk aversion.
We have given insights on the proposed metric, which we have called utility-discounted accuracy, and have used it to
make extensive empirical comparisons of credal, as well as precise, classifiers. These tests, available in this form for the first
time, show that themetric can easily be used in practice to finely compare classifiers, and to gain insights in their behaviour.
It would be important in the future to address the problem of evaluation of indeterminate predictors more generally.
In fact, imprecise probability theories appear to have given so far very limited attention to the evaluation of indeterminate
predictors. This is unfortunate, because indeterminacy is a fundamental characteristic of imprecise probability, and one
that offers a principled approach to make credible predictions even in extreme states of poor knowledge. Moreover, for any
theory that claims itself to be statistical, it seems inescapable that a model’s performance is measured—also—on data.
On the other hand, the extension of the results in this paper to more general settings looks challenging. A major issue
concerns cost-sensitive classification, that is, classification problems where the reward matrix is different from I. A crucial
point is thatusing I leads tozero rewardwhateverwrongclassification ismade.Whenweallowdifferent incorrectpredictions
to be assigned different rewards, we can no longer follow the argumentation that in Theorem 1 led us to derive discounted
accuracy. Another subtle issue is that with some cost matrices, the optimal randomized strategy may turn out to exclude
betting on some class in the set-valued prediction. These observations make us think that it is not straightforward to obtain
an objective measure of performance under rewards more general than 0 and 1. Since this is a basic stepping stone in the
construction of a utility-basedmetric, it could be difficult to define ametric in such a generalized setup. This problem affects
classification, but it would affect even more an extension of this work to set-valued predictions of a continuous quantity, as
it happens in regression, because 0-1 rewards are just too restrictive in that case. This says once more that a cost-sensitive
generalization is needed. Can it be achieved? Some recent work by Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane [20] seems to indicate
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that there may be some fundamental limitation to evaluate indeterminate predictors in general. However, such a work is
based on the concept of a scoring rule, and this might leave the door open to alternative approaches. It is anyway a question
that deserves careful consideration.
Finally, we would like to recall that the work in this paper has shown that there are relations between the evaluation of
credal classifiers and finance. This seems tomake thiswork somewhat close to recent research that explores the connections
between utility and machine learning [13]. Deepening these relations might be fruitful in future research.
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